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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LAW SCHOOL TEACHING

JERRY J. PHILLIPS*
When I was a beginning teacher I heard Grant Gilmore1 speak at a meeting
of law school teachers. He had just received the accolade of the teaching
profession, and in his acceptance speech he made some remarks about
teaching.
“Teaching,” he said, in his low, unassertive voice, “is the loneliest
profession there is. You never know if you’re doing it right or not.”
I don’t know about other professions, but I do know he hit the nail on the
head about the difficulty of law school teaching.
In the first place, teachers are torn between what they think they should be
teaching, and what students think they should be teaching. Students come to
law school with a pretty firm set of convictions about what law is all about. It
is a set of rules which you have to learn if you ever expect to pass a law exam,
or the bar exam. Later, as students grow more sophisticated, they come to
believe that law is a set of rules of the game. You have to learn how to play
the game.
The old socratic method (made famous in the film and television series The
Paper Chase) fools no one these days—unless you happen to be the timid,
faint-of-heart who should never have come to law school in the first place.
Anybody knows that she who asks the questions—particularly if she has
superior knowledge—controls the answer. And if there is no right answer,
then why bother with the rather futile exercise of asking? Everyone knows that
Socrates was joking when he said the Delphic oracle thought him the wisest
man in the world since he alone knew that he knew nothing.2
I once asked Grant Gilmore how he handled two irreconcilable cases. The
students would say there is a division of authority. But what about the clash of
reasoning; which opinion was the better reasoned opinion?
Professor Gilmore thought long and carefully before he answered. Then
he said something to the effect that it’s oftentimes well-nigh impossible to
make the correct choice between right and wrong. But in the end you have to

* W. P. Toms Professor of Law and Walter W. Bussart Distinguished Professor of Tort Law,
University of Tennessee School of Law.
1. Late Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
2. See JOHN MILTON, PARADISE REGAINED 16 (Scolar Press Ltd. 1968).
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make that decision, he said, however close the choice may be. He seemed to
take it for granted that I understood why you have to make that decision.
I recently read an outstanding article by Alex B. Long on tortious
interference.3 There, Professor Long explores the recent rise in popularity of
the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage. He carefully
notes how this tort undermines the employee-at-will doctrine, and how the
distinction between principal and agent has become blurred in the decisions.
He concludes by examining the defense of truth and the pervasive implications
of that defense for communicative torts. One comes away from reading the
article with something of a world view of the law of torts.
I am told that Jan Deutsch4 does the same kind of synthesis in the
classroom at Yale. He relates one aspect of corporations to another aspect, and
then to another, and another, and often he leaps the bounds of corporations into
other fields of law and non-law. In his classes you get the sense of the law
being a seamless whole.
The greatest drawback to present-day law teaching is that students do not
expect to have to prepare diligently for class. They come to class to be told
what the law is, and to be told clearly and entertainingly. They are the
consumer, and they expect to receive fair value for their money. But in the
process they sell themselves short.
I think learning the law is a lot like learning to play the piano. You must
prepare with the utmost diligence. You must learn the scales, the chords, the
timing, the phrasing—without fault, insofar as it is humanly possible to do so.
Then you come to your lesson, or to class, to learn interpretation—how to
lean on the notes, when and where, and how to prick them; how to play lightly,
and how to play darkly; how to walk, and how to fly; how to figure out what
the composer was trying to say, and how to add your own interpretation to the
composer’s meaning.
How do you know your own interpretation is right? You don’t, says Grant
Gilmore; you never know for sure. But making that informed decision is what
Lon Fuller, in his little book entitled Legal Fictions,5 calls the exercise of
judgment—the highest of human arts.
In my own classes, I try to steer away from the holistic approach because it
very quickly becomes confusing. I prefer to work with elasticizing judicial
concepts. I used to think that concepts were rather mechanical, and that policy
was where the real action was. But of late I find it difficult to distinguish
concepts (rules, if you will) from policy (morality, if you will).

3. See generally Alex B. Long, Tortious Interference with Business Relations: “The Other
White Meat” of Employment Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 863 (2000).
4. Walter Hale Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
5. LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 136-37 (1967).
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A favorite case is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.6 Why does Cardozo
confuse generations of law students by talking about duty instead of
foreseeability? Is it because New York was stuck with the direct-cause rule of
proximate causation, and he wanted to avoid applying that rule? Then why not
change the rule, from direct cause (Polemis)7 to foreseeability (Wagon
Mound)8, instead of talking about duty? Of course Cardozo was not the first to
confuse duty with proximate cause.
Why didn’t Mrs. Palsgraf attack the railroad, or the scale maker, for having
weighing scales that were top-heavy, or improperly anchored? Was this legal
malpractice on the part of her attorney?
Suppose our boarding passenger carried an invaluable vase, rather than
fireworks, wrapped in newspaper. Could he recover for the value of the vase
that the conductor knocked from his arm?
Suppose the trainman struck the vase intentionally. Transferred intent to
Mrs. Palsgraf, from trespass to battery (or perhaps from battery to battery,
since the vase was intimately associated with the passenger)?
A problem in conversion concerns the employee whose employer gave him
thirty-four dollars with which to purchase a page of one hundred stamps. The
employee had no money of his own. When he got to the post office and
received the page of stamps, as a stamp collector he immediately recognized
the page to be very valuable because of an idiosyncrasy in the printing. He
took the page to a stamp dealer, sold it for $34,000, and bought another page of
stamps which he returned to his employer. Did the employee convert the
original thirty-four dollars, which were quickly replaced with a like amount of
money? If he converted the thirty-four dollars, then why not the $34,000 as
well, as fruits of the poisonous tree? The students have a hard time believing
he must surrender the $34,000 to his employer, should the ruse be discovered.
Another favorite is the products case of Flippo v. Mode O’ Day Frock
Shops.9 There Ms. Flippo, while trying on a new pair of stretch pants at Mode
O’ Day’s clothing shop, was bitten in the thigh by a brown recluse spider
allegedly concealed in the pants.10 She sued the shop but could not prove
negligence.11 The court directed a verdict against her on her strict liability
count on the grounds that nothing was wrong with the pants.12 But surely there
was! Was the court really concerned about breaking down the distinction
6. See generally 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
7. In re An Arbitration between Polemis and Another and Furness, Withy and Co., 3 K.B.
560 (C.A. 1921).
8. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon Mound), [1961]
A.C. 388 (1961).
9. See generally 449 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. 1970).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 695.
12. Id.
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between business premises liability and products liability if it allowed Ms.
Flippo to recover, and if so, why not say so and then justify the distinction?
There is the problem of the runaway bus, careening down a mountainside
road with twenty elderly passengers aboard. Both the brakes and the horn have
failed, through no fault of the driver. On the right side of the road was a steep
bluff, and on the left a deep ravine, with nowhere to pull off. The bus came in
sight of a subdivision entrance, where five children were standing oblivious to
the oncoming bus. Should the driver enter the subdivision to save her twenty
passengers, although she would probably kill or maim the five children in the
process? Or should she continue on, with the high probability that she and the
twenty passengers would all be killed or maimed? If she hits the five children,
she would be liable, would she not? Public necessity does not apply to the
taking of human life, and surely self-defense does not apply here. If she
sacrificed the twenty passengers, will that act be an involuntary one for which
she is not liable? Some students think that twenty elderly people are worth
more than five children, but I caution that I don’t think the risk-benefit
balancing test works here.
One of my very favorite cases is Marbury v. Madison13—not so much
because of the way Justice Marshall pulled judicial supremacy out of the
constitutional hat, but because of the way in which he found Section 13 of the
1789 Judiciary Act unconstitutional, thereby preventing him from issuing a
mandamus to require the Secretary of State to deliver Marbury his rightful J.P.
commission.14 Section 13 more or less tracked Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, in first conferring original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court,
followed by a conferral of appellate jurisdiction. At the end of the appellate
conferral, separated from the remainder of the section by a semicolon, was a
conferral on the Court of the power to issue writs of mandamus and
prohibition. Marbury filed his suit as one of original jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court, seeking a writ of mandamus against Secretary of State
Madison.15
After reviewing the allegedly incontestable right of Marbury to have his
commission, and to have it by order of mandamus to the Secretary of State, the
Court mysteriously concluded that it lacked the power to issue the writ in this
case directly to a non-judicial government officer, since such a writ could only
be issued in the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction.16 And this was
not a case of Article III original jurisdiction, said the Court—which most
assuredly it was not.17

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See generally 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 176.
Id.
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Mr. Lee, Marbury’s attorney, gamely argued that although the issue before
the Court looked like one of appellate jurisdiction, it really was original since,
by attaching the power of the writ to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court,
Congress had converted the appellate jurisdiction to original.18 Bosh! said the
Court, ipse dixit: Congress lacks the constitutional power to do that.
Therefore, Congress’s attempt to confer appellate jurisdiction on the Court
under the guise of original jurisdiction, by means of the writ of mandamus, was
unconstitutional and the case must be dismissed for lack of original
jurisdiction.19
The question in this whole argument—a point that has never been
explained by anyone, so far as I can tell—is why the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to a non-judicial officer can only be done as an exercise of Article
III original jurisdiction? Nothing in Article III implies such a limitation.
Nothing in the common law, either of America or England, implies such a
limitation. And Marshall cites no authority whatsoever in support of such a
limitation.
One is left with the curious suspicion that Marshall may have made the
whole thing up about the ability of the Court to issue such a mandamus only in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction. He could have simply said this was not
a case of original jurisdiction, and dismissed, without ever getting to the whole
brouhaha of the power of Congress to convert appellate to original by means of
the alchemic writ.
Did Marshall make the whole thing up? Who can say, since there is no
authority one way or the other. But when a question is one of first impression,
should the Court not at least announce a reason for its decision, rather than
issuing an ipse dixit? Perhaps, if you have no reason, ipse dixit is the only way
to reach a desired result. Nevertheless, the process seems peculiarly
Machiavellian.
Even if the reason for finding Section 13 unconstitutional is based on a
dubious proposition about the nature of the writ of mandamus, that fact has no
effect on the soundness of the basic proposition about judicial supremacy. Or
does it?
Law is a many-faceted subject, and there is no one way to teach it any
more than there is any one way to practice it. As a friend of mine once said,
“I’ve forgotten more law than most people ever knew.” I remember very little
law that I learned in law school, and next to nothing of what I learned for the
bar exam.
But one thing I do remember. I remember the zest with which Grant
Gilmore and others taught the law. I remember the excitement of examining

18. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174.
19. Id.
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the underpinnings of the law. And I have always remembered never to take
any answer as final. As Grant Gilmore so succinctly put it:
Like the blind men dealing with the elephant, we must erect hypotheses on the
basis of inadequate evidence. That does no harm—at all events it is the human
condition from which we will not escape—so long as we do not delude
ourselves into thinking that we have finally seen our elephant whole.20

20. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110 (1977). Professor Gilmore was
apparently referring to an Indian folk tale about six blind, allegedly wise men who came upon an
elephant and touched various parts of it. Based on their limited experience with the elephant,
they disputed loud and long with each other over what the elephant was really like. See SIX
BLIND MEN AND AN ELEPHANT (Hamlyn Pub. Co. Ltd. 1986).

